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EDITORIAL

The editor's first duty, in this issue of *Bellarmino Commentary*, is to thank all who have expressed their appreciation. Their interest is the more heartening in that they were kind enough to criticize as well as encourage. Thus we are confirmed in our general plan, dictated in part by circumstance and in our brevity, which is a quality we shall try to retain. Again, we know that our readers would like more informative summaries and reviews with a greater proportion of the former; these we shall attempt to give them.

One pleasant surprise was the wide range of readers who were good enough to write. We had thought of ourselves, students, as speaking to other students and capturing sometimes the benign attention of our elders who might regain through us some of that contact with theological books and periodicals which, perforce, can be maintained only where the work of the province faculties is pursued. But we have found a wider audience both here and in other theological faculties of the Society. We are read by theologians who have had patience with our attempts to speak a scientific language more properly their own. Hence our judgments cannot be less qualified and reserved, nor can we avoid retailing in English concepts not always at ease in its idiom. Moreover, we must often cite, summarize and review, assimilate and use articles and books in the principal foreign languages.

Fidelity to such a plan is largely possible because we have the willing co-operation of members of other provinces. We are grateful for the greater variety of thought and style which they contribute.

We should like to increase our official circulation but, for a number of cogent reasons, must leave the consideration of the matter to the future.

The editor is most grateful for all the helpful suggestions he has received and would welcome more, for they are a valuable stimulus in continuing to the best of our ability a work which has been blessed with Very Reverend Father General's paternal approbation and encouragement.

THE COMPASSIONATE PRIESTHOOD

JOHN BERRELL, S.J.

COMPASSION is certainly a characteristic of the ideal priest. Would many see in compassion the priestly virtue *par excellence*? To the persecuted Jewish Christians, in all probability exiled Jewish priests of Jerusalem, who received the Letter to the Hebrews the idea must have seemed yet more surprising (1). One aspect of compassion was understood, to be sure, as a divine virtue, so conspicuous a virtue in fact that "The Merciful" became one of the names of Yahweh. But the notion of a priesthood that is of its nature compassionate is not to be found in the Old Testament (2). The sentiments of the Jewish priest in no way impinged upon his sacred office. Thus he was forbidden "either to rend his garments for the dead, even his nearest and dearest, or to take from his head the insignia of the priesthood, or on any account to leave the sacred precincts under the pretext of mourning . . . so will he have his feeling of pity under control and continue throughout free from sorrow (3)". Moreover, at the time when Hebrews was written, the harshness and arrogance of the Sadducees towards the weak and small were known only too well; and the Sadducees were the priestly party, guardians of priestly tradition. May we not imagine the revolutionary impact made upon the priests to whom Hebrews was addressed when they were told:

"For every High Priest taken from among men is appointed as a representative of men in the things that refer to God, that he may offer gifts and sacrifices for sins; *qui condolere possit iis qui ignorant et errant*, since he himself is encompassed with weakness (5, 1-2)."

The first assertion (*omnis Pontifex . . . ut offerat dona et sacrificia*) is generic; it will apply to Jewish and other priests. The succeeding words show compenetration of ideas in the author's thought; he appears to be speaking generically, but it is quite clear that a capacity for compassion, though present in all priests, is of no special relevance except to the Christian priest. Of special interest, too, are the objects of this compassion: *qui ignorant et errant*. These are no less than technical terms for sinners (4), whether through unawareness (*agnouentes*) or through frailty (*planomenoi*).

The phrase, therefore, which we have left in the Vulgate version must be of the greatest significance to anyone seeking to understand more of the nature of the Christian priesthood, for it states an essential characteristic of the Christian priesthood and it occurs in an epistle whose subject is the priesthood of Christ.

But to turn from the Vulgate to the Greek original of this striking phrase, *qui condolere possit*, may occasion some surprise. The LXX abounds in phrases which describe compassion, yet the verb here used by the author of Hebrews (*metriopathein*) is not among them; indeed it is a biblical *hapax legomenon*. Further, when the word is used in Greek literature, it does not appear to refer to a feeling of compassion.

The origin of the term was philosophical. It was used by the Peripatetics to describe the behaviour of the Magnanimous Man; for he, in

suffering or in sorrow (as in all else), was to act with moderation (*metriopatheia*), showing neither complete insensitivity or detachment, nor on the other hand excess of sympathy. In Philo, for example, it is Abraham's moderation in grief at the death of Sarah which is to prove to his Alexandrian co-religionist the undoubted moral eminence of the Patriarch. And this studied moderation is emotionally so neutral that we find it recommended by Hippocrates as part of the ideal bed-side manner where effusiveness and indifference are equally unseemly (5). For the Stoics the word had the same meaning, though for them, since insensitivity was the ideal, the moderation of *metriopatheia* was at most a second best.

In deference to this well-established sense of "moderation of feeling" many commentators, with Père Bonsirven, understand that the priest must set just limits to his anger at the sins of the people (*paschein kata to metron*); he must not give vent to his anger as Moses did. This implies clemency without weakness or excessive indulgence. The sinner should be welcomed "with tact and equity (6)". And what then is new to Christ, the High Priest? It is that he will be able to do the same though he is sinless (7).

This understanding of the term seems further justified by the choice of words in Hebrews itself. It is not more than three verses since the author has used the natural term (*sumpathein*) for the compassionate priest. And now, in the priest's approach to the very sinners for whom he offers sacrifice, there is a change and we are given a cold technical word. Yet St. Jerome rejected the technical sense; and, at first sight, his action would appear odd since so many commentators seem able to prove him wrong. Our priest should not be compassionate, they say; he should be moderate or equitable.

But the Vulgate is not without its eloquent supporters, and at their head today stands Père Spicq, O.P., who in his recent monumental commentary on Hebrews (8) gives a number of interesting arguments to champion the ancient version.

To begin with, if we take *metriopathein* as of moderate clemency which does not yield to anger or to excessive indulgence, we thereby assume that the author is discussing the priest's rôle as judge (indeed as judge against whom the sins have been committed), whereas he is here concerned solely with the priest's rôle as advocate. And if we restrict ourselves to the notion of the priest who has a nicely balanced or calculated feeling for the sinner, this notion seems badly at war with the context. What has it in common with the paroxysm and fulness of grief, the piercing cry and tears of Gethsemani which belong, say the succeeding verses (5, 7), to our model of compassion? His agony is here recalled to serve as the author's proof that our Lord truly conforms to the priestly pattern. Again, we know that he is compassionate from the preceding verses (4, 15-16), and the *pathos* in question must tally with the *sumpathein* of these verses (9):

"It is not as if our High Priest was incapable of feeling for us (*sumpathein*) in our humiliations; he has been through every trial, fashioned as we are, only sinless. Let us come boldly, then, before the throne of grace to meet with mercy (4, 15-16. Knox) . . ."

To further his argument Père Spicq asserts that, when *metriopathein* is used of human relations, it has the sense of magnanimity (10). In Hebrews it must bear the meaning of condescension, indulgence, generosity; and it suggests that compassion is integral to the priesthood. In fact the indifference of the Stoics would be a diriment impediment to the assumption of the priesthood of Christ. Père Spicq is thus led to take the word as practically synonymous with the certain expression of compassion which the author has already employed (*compati, sumpathein*, 4, 15). The priest in his relation with sinners should have "a spontaneous (*innée à la nature*) compassion" for them, or "a natural sympathy" with them. Girded with frailty and *in conformity with his human nature* his compassion for sinners is such as to bring him gentleness. Understanding them, his desire is to help them. Such in Père Spicq's opinion is the correct nuance of the difficult prefix, *metrio-*. St. Jerome was right after all.

But we may feel the need to test the evidence upon which this opinion now rests. It must be owned that, philologically, only the passage cited by Père Spicq from Josephus holds any promise. Although other passages adduced will admit the translation of *metriopathein* as indulgent compassion, none seems to demand it, or to lessen the antecedent likelihood of the opposite viewpoint (11). But Josephus tells enough. Titus and Vespasian are admired for their attitude to the Jews after the war:

"One may indeed be astonished at the generosity (*megalophrosune*) of Titus and Vespasian who behaved with indulgent compassion (*metriopathesanton*) after the wars and great battles they had with us (10a)."

Though the word *metriopathesanton* is here generally taken by scholars and translators to mean moderation, the context does demand Père Spicq's sense, imperial indulgence or compassion; it is precisely this which makes Josephus exclaim that there is cause for astonishment (12).

Given this evidence from Josephus, the reader of Hebrews with his eye on the characteristic development of thought in the context of *qui condolere possit* will have to admit that St. Jerome could hardly have bettered his turn of phrase in translation, since it adds a certain "generosity" of feeling to the *qui non possit compati* which goes before it (4, 15). He has used *sumpathein* (*compati*) in these earlier verses with *astheneia* (*infirmetas*) when he asserts that Christ has shared our weakness as The Suffering Servant. He can hardly use *compati* again in verse 2 where it would have the unacceptable meaning that Christ shares our iniquity in the strict sense, that is, by his personal sins, since *qui ignorant et errant* (*agnoountes, planomenoi*) are accepted biblical terms for sinners. The author must therefore chose a cognate word, *metriopathein*, and in doing so he adds a certain generosity of feeling to all that is implied by *sumpathein*, as is clear not only from profane usage, noted above, but also from verse 7 where his proof that Christ is able to compassionate sinners (*metriopathein dunamenos*) is the "great cry and tears" of the agony.

Does Hebrews tell us any more in individual verses or in its general argument to assure us that the Christian priest is essentially a compassionate priest? We read (2, 17):

"Unde debuit per omnia fratribus similari *ut misericors (eleemon) fieret et fidelis pontifex ad Deum, ut repropitiaret delicta populi.*"

The title, "The Merciful" is explicitly applied to Christ only here in all the New Testament and it indicates not so much the mercy by which sins are forgiven, as compassion for the sufferings and miseries of others (13). There is agreement among commentators today that "The Merciful" and "The Faithful" must be taken together (14). He is our representative *because* he is compassionate; and his compassion stems from his suffering and death:

"It is because he himself has been tried by suffering, that he has power to help us in the trials we undergo (2, 18. Knox)."

Hence there is no doubt that here too Hebrews designates compassion as the priestly virtue *par excellence* and Père Spicq can rightly say (15):

"Le prêtre est, en effet, institué en fonction des hommes, il n'existe que pour eux (5, 1) afin de les arracher à la misère du péché. Comment pourrait-il exercer ce rôle sans être toute miséricorde?"

Active compassion for others is normally preceded by personal suffering on the part of him who compassionates, though the word compassion does not make this explicit in ordinary parlance. In Hebrews the notions of personal suffering and resultant compassion are woven together as correlatives. The recipients of the Letter are commended in other verses for bearing their own suffering manfully — and are at once commended also for compassionating their brethren (10, 32ff.). They are even invited to share by their compassion in the one atoning sacrifice of Christ:

"Let us, too, go out to him away from the camp, bearing the ignominy he bore (13, 13. Knox)."

and mention of this sacrifice of theirs, offered *through* their High Priest (v. 15), at once suggests to the author a characteristic of sacrifice, Christ's no less than theirs, which is especially relevant to them in their present suffering: as in the psalm which he quotes (49, 50, 14:23), the sacrifice in which they are to join is a sacrifice of praise-thanksgiving offered by them when they invoke Elohim-Yahweh *in the day of affliction*. And now that they have understood the double nature of Christ's compassion (his personal abasement and its correlative — the share he takes in the afflictions of his brethren), they can also understand why the author immediately insists that they are themselves to perform works which are the fruits of compassion (v. 16): "God takes pleasure in such sacrifice as this".

The greater the share in Christ's priesthood, the greater the need for compassionating the afflicted; and as sinners (*agnoountes* and *planomenoi*) are indeed the afflicted, we are forced to return from these texts to St. Jerome's *qui condolere possit*, that is, to compassion as essentially a mark of the Christian priesthood.

A central theme of the Letter is the atoning sacrifice of Christ. The passion was a scandal to the "Hebrews" and the author must show them that here is the great sacrifice of the New Law (7, 20-25; 8, 4: 6ff; 9, 11ff). Can we say that the doctrine of the compassionate priesthood develops naturally from his argument? Yes, the words *ut misericors fieret* . . .

pontifex (2, 17) are the climax of the author's exposition of the unique fitness of the economy of the incarnation and passion of Christ. They are told that it is precisely because Christ has "been through every trial" that he is able to compassionate us (*sumpathein*) and accordingly we may with boldness find our help in him, the throne of grace (2, 17; 4, 16). It is because he is compassionate that he is "cause of salvation (5, 10)". True, Christ, unlike the unfortunate "Hebrews", suffers now no more. But they must not think that he therefore forgets what human weakness and suffering are. Though he has

"penetrated the heavens (4, 14),"

"taken his seat in heaven, on the right hand where God sits in majesty, ministering, now, in the sanctuary, that true tabernacle which the Lord, not man, has set up (8, 1-2),"

none the less his act of compassion is everlasting. As Père Spicq puts it, he is established in a state of permanent compassion (16). So he is a priest for ever: a compassionate priest.

A further difficulty for the "Hebrews" was the fact that Christ is not now a visible priest ministering in a visible sanctuary (8, 4:6ff) and the author must explain that the New Sacrifice needs no yearly renewal in the inner shrine, but is one (17) and of everlasting value (18), and that Christ "is now ministering in that true tabernacle which the Lord, not man, has set up". He constantly appeals to the truth that Christ's priesthood, unlike that of the Old Law, is perfect (19), that Christ is both *Consummator* and *Consummatus*; and he repeatedly quotes from the psalm,

"Thou art a priest for ever after the manner of Melchisedech," where we have a divine oath to Christ's priesthood (7, 21-22). This oath is sealed, as Dom Dupont has shown, at the moment of his entering into glory. Then it is that he is fully perfected in his priesthood (20).

The "Hebrews" will doubtless take comfort from the knowledge that Christ's sacrifice is eternal, extending not only to their sins but also to the bonds of suffering and death, a sacrifice in which they can share. But the author seems aware that it is only when they have understood that the priesthood of Christ in glory is a priesthood perfected and triumphant, that these exiled and afflicted priests of Sion will at last be assured of the true effectiveness of his compassion (21).

References:

- (1) "It has been established with great probability that the Epistle to the Hebrews is addressed not to a local church but to a group of persons of Jewish origin, priests of Jerusalem converted by St. Stephen." C. Spicq, O.P., *L'Épître aux Hébreux*, Paris 1952, I, p. 231.
- (2) Cf. Bonsirven, *Le Judaïsme Palestinien*, I, p. 134 and Spicq, op. cit. I, p. 254.
- (3) Philo, de Spec. Leg. I, 115.
- (4) We have here no mention of those who sin out of contempt or with the hand raised against God (*hekousios*). Is the case for compassion with them less compelling?
- (5) Philo, de Abr. 257: Hippocr. Medic. I.
- (6) Ex 32, 19: Bonsirven, *Épître aux Hébreux*, p. 264.
- (7) Ibid. p. 265.
- (8) *L'Épître aux Hébreux*, in the series *Études Bibliques*, I, 1952; II, 1953.
- (9) Philo's use of "*metriopathein*" in Leg. Alleg. III, 129-132 is adduced by P. Spicq in support of his argument, but Philo, now taking the Stoic side, clearly says that "*apatheia*" (perfect freedom from passion) belongs to the

perfect man while "metriopatheia" (the practice of moderation) belongs to one who is making gradual progress. This latter would be an odd grade of virtue for "Hebrews" to apply to Christ, especially since he is himself made perfect ("teleiotheis") in v 9.

- (10) Josephus, AJ. XII, 3, 128; Philo, de Spec. Leg. III, 96; Plutarch, de Fraterno Amore, 18 and de Cohibenda Ira, 10.
- (11) P. Spicq quotes Plutarch, loc. cit., in favour of his thesis: "metriopathein ekgonon anexikakian". But "endurance" is surely the fruit of "control of passion" or "moderation of feeling", not of "generous compassion".
- (12) The people of Alexandria and Antioch, both powerful cities, had asked that their Jewish inhabitants be deprived of citizenship. Yet Titus and Vespasian, says Josephus, in spite of all the hardships they had endured and in spite of the bitterness caused by the Jewish refusal to surrender arms, would not accede to their request though it would have been easier to do so. The Jews could not have complained of unfairness. The point is not merely that Titus and Vespasian showed moderation by controlling their anger and acting fairly—they crossed the line and showed indulgent compassion. Hence there is evidence that, in the time of Josephus, the meaning of "metriopathein" had been extended from moderation of feeling to generous feeling or compassion. P. Spicq's philological argument receives a certain measure of support from the Protestant scholar, Otto Michel, in his recent work, *Der Brief an die Hebräer*, Göttingen 1955, pp. 130-1. The French Protestant scholar, Jean Héring, is entirely in agreement with P. Spicq. Cf. *L'Épître aux Hébreux*, Paris 1954, p. 51.
- (13) Spicq, op. cit. II, p. 47. Cf. also J. Guillet, *Thèmes Bibliques*, Paris 1951, pp. 78ff., for the title "The Merciful" and "The Faithful" as applied to Yahweh in the context of the Sinaitic covenant.
- (14) P. Spicq, op. cit. II, p. 48.
- (15) Ibid. p. 47.
- (16) Ibid. p. 48.
- (17) Heb 7, 27; 9, 12: 25-28; 10, 10-14.
- (18) Heb 7, 23-5; 29; 10, 12-14.
- (19) Heb 2, 10; 5, 9; 7, 28; 9, 24; 10, 12-14; 12, 2.
- (20) The reference to the celestial glorification of Christ belongs both to the quotation from Ps 2, 7 and to Ps 109 (110), 4; cf. J. Dupont, *Filius Meus Es Tu*, *Recherches Sc. Rel.* 35 (1948) 521-543, esp. 539-40.
- (21) Heb 5, 9; 7, 28; 9, 7; 9, 11-12; 9, 24; 9, 28; 10, 11-14; 13, 15.

OUR SACRIFICE

BERNARD HALL, S.J.

THE Mass contains a true sacrifice—the visible sacrifice that Christ left to his Church at the Last Supper—the propitiatory sacrifice which represents and applies to men the fruits of the bloody sacrifice of the Cross, from which it differs only in the form of its offering. This is the doctrine defined by the Council of Trent and supported by the unanimous tradition of the Church. Christ has given to the Church his own sacrifice to such an extent that, in the Mass, Christ's sacrifice becomes our sacrifice and the priest can justly say: *Pray brethren, that my sacrifice and yours may be made acceptable to God the Father Almighty.*

Yet, if Christ's sacrifice on the Cross was one and all-sufficient, how is it possible for us to have anything more than a commemorative representation of his true sacrifice? In what sense can the Mass be our sacrifice?

Luther and the early Reformers, taking their stand upon the uniqueness of Christ's sacrifice, did not scruple to sweep aside the

doctrine of the sacrificial nature of the Mass as a blasphemous superstition. For them the Mass was a commemorative meal and no more. The "Lord's Supper" might be a sacrament; it was not a sacrifice. That neither the Last Supper nor the Mass could be a real sacrifice was proved for them beyond all doubt by the absence of any real immolation. Christ was immolated once and for all upon the Cross: there and there alone did he make his propitiatory sacrifice.

To answer these objections many post-Tridentine theologians have tried to demonstrate that: (a) the Mass does not derogate from Christ's own sacrifice perpetuated and re-presented in time and that: (b) the Mass is a true sacrifice, because it does contain an immolation. The first point is certainly true; the Mass must be Christ's sacrifice, for his sacrifice alone has power to make propitiation for our sins, but it is not equally true that the Mass cannot be Christ's sacrifice unless it contains an immolation of Christ. And, in fact, these theologians have found it very difficult to show convincingly just how the Mass contains an immolation. The Mass, as Trent says, is bloodless. The immolation, then, is bloodless. What can a bloodless immolation be? They answer, broadly, in two ways.

Immolationist Theories

The first answer (that of Vasquez) is that the immolation is merely symbolic or mystical and is contained in the sign of the separated species. To this theory it can reasonably be objected that, if immolation is essential to sacrifice, then the mere representation of immolation can constitute nothing more than the representation of sacrifice.

The second answer is that there is a real immolation. Christ is *really* immolated by being reduced to, and constricted by, the sacramental species (so De Lugo), OR he is *virtually* immolated by reason of the words of consecration which have the power to put him to death and, were it not for his impassible, glorified state, would actually do so (so Lessius), OR he is *sacramentally* immolated in the sense that the sacramental signs signify death and, because they are sacramental, effect what they signify (so Vonier (1) and Casel). Against all such views the fact that Christ is now impassible and can suffer no real change whatsoever poses a most serious objection. And even if such immolation were possible, it is unthinkable that the consecrating priest (that we in our sacrifice) should willingly play the part of Christ's executioners.

The *impasse* into which these immolationist theories lead is fairly expressed by saying that immolation is either merely symbolic or in some way real, and that, whilst symbolic immolation is insufficient, real immolation is impossible.

Fr. de la Taille (2) suggests a way out of this *impasse*. So long as we think of immolation in the Mass as being something done to Christ, there is no satisfactory explanation, but if we recognise that Christ is now and for ever will be a glorified Victim, we shall see that there is no need for him to be *made* a Victim. All that is necessary to constitute the Mass a sacrifice is for us to make our own oblation of the Eternal Victim, who is present on the altar. The Mass is our sacrifice because we actively offer Christ the Victim. Because the Victim offered

is the Victim of Calvary the *passive* sacrifice of the Mass is numerically one with Calvary, and therefore does not derogate from the Cross. Because it is we who actually make the offering the *active* sacrifice of the Mass is truly ours.

What Fr. de la Taille has to say has contributed enormously to our understanding of the Sacrifice of the Mass, but his theory has this weakness that, though it requires immolation as an essential of propitiatory sacrifice, yet the only immolation the Mass contains is, on his own admission, unreal. In place of immolation he puts a Victim who was once immolated and he claims that the presence of such a Victim, accompanied by the symbolic representation of immolation, is sufficient substitute. This position is not easily justified; it looks very like special, *ad hoc*, pleading. If immolation is an essential of sacrifice, and we are unable in any real way to produce or re-produce that immolation, it seems that our sacrifice must ever lack something that is essential to sacrifice. Not even Fr. de la Taille's theory escapes the immolationist *impasse*.

Sacrifice without Immolation

The difficulty can be solved only if immolation is not of the essence of sacrifice. Lepin (3) has shown that this, in fact, is in keeping with the unanimous teaching of tradition up to and including the Council of Trent. No Father or pre-Tridentine theologian ever claimed that the Mass contained anything more than a representation of immolation. They were agreed that there was nothing in the Mass to correspond, in the order of realities, with Christ's death on the Cross. Yet they insisted on the reality of the sacrifice offered. There is, then, no strict connection between immolation and sacrifice. Because of this Lepin concludes that the essence of sacrifice is oblation. He considers that post-Tridentine theologians have been misled by accepting the Reformers' (untraditional) equation of propitiatory sacrifice with real immolation. The Mass is a sacrifice, not because Christ is immolated in any sense in the Mass, but because it is the offering by the Church, the Whole Christ, of Christ the Eternal Victim to his Father.

This view escapes the difficulties of the immolationist theories, but if we are to understand it as asserting that sacrifice is nothing more than oblation, then it is inadequate. "Every sacrifice is an oblation," says St. Thomas, "but not every oblation is a sacrifice (4)." A sacrifice is an oblation, but it is a special kind of oblation. It is an offering in which the *oblata* are removed from profane use and made sacred to God by some action performed over them. "*Sacrificia proprie dicuntur, quando circa res Deo oblatas aliquid fit; — et hoc ipsum nomen sonat, nam sacrificium dicitur ex hoc, quod homo facit aliquid sacrum* (5)." The action which has, historically, been most commonly used to make the offering "sacred", i.e. to effect the transference of the *oblata* from man's dominion to God's, is the expressive one of immolation, of killing and burning animals, for example. But this is not essential. The essential element of sacrifice is the actual transference of dominion, and any action performed over the *oblata* which can effect this transfer is sufficient to make the offering a true sacrifice.

Sacrifice in the Juridic Order

At the Last Supper all these elements were present. It was first of all an oblation; Christ there made himself present under the sign of the separated species; he there made a freely-willed offering of himself to his Father. But it was more than a bare oblation, for Christ, by means of the sign he used and the words he said, made himself not merely present, but present as a propitiatory Victim, given to God for man's redemption. By this sign, he formally and irrevocably consecrated himself (made himself "sacred") to God; he handed over to his Father by a public, liturgical action all his rights to his own human life. The Last Supper was therefore a sacrifice. And because the Mass is the re-enactment of the Supper which Christ himself authorised and empowered his apostles to perform, the Mass, too, is a sacrifice. In the Mass, by reason of the double consecration, Christ is really present and really handed over to his Father as propitiatory victim. The consecration is the powerful, effective sign by which Christ sacrificed himself, and which he commanded his priests to repeat. "Do *this*," he said, and this is what the priest does in the Mass, "showing the Lord's death until he come".

But if Christ effectively handed himself over to his Father at the Supper, how can he effectively hand himself over again, either on the Cross or in the Mass? Even more serious: if the Supper was a true propitiatory sacrifice, the world was redeemed at the Supper and there was nothing left for the Cross to do.

That is not so. The Supper contains all the essentials of sacrifice, and would have been a sacrifice even if the Cross had not followed, but as an historical fact the sacrifice of the Supper was physically consummated on the Cross. The Supper was ordered to, and dependent upon, the Cross as all its symbolism shows. As an historical fact the Sacrifice that saved the world was the sacrifice that was physically consummated on the Cross, but in the juridic order all that was necessary was done at the Supper. An example which may illustrate this completeness in the juridic order and dependence in the physical, is that of a man taking vows in a religious order. In the juridic order his handing-over of self to God is complete as soon as he pronounces the formula of his vows: he can never be more consecrated to God. Nevertheless the formula is only understandable and only has force, if it is meant as a pledge of living out the life of the vows in the physical order: the juridic handing-over is ordered to and dependent on the physical. Yet even if no physical fulfilment followed (e.g. because the religious died immediately after taking his vows) we could not say that he was not fully consecrated to God. On the other hand, we would not say that because this juridic transfer was complete, it made the physical fulfilment unnecessary or ineffective. In a similar way the Supper was a complete sacrifice in the juridic order, without in the least making the Cross, its physical fulfilment, unnecessary or ineffective.

Christ's Sacrifice, Individual and Corporate

Even if we allow the validity of this distinction between the juridic and physical orders, there still remains the difficulty of how, if Christ

offered himself effectively in the juridic order at the Supper, he can do so again in the Mass.

The answer to this difficulty is provided by a true understanding of what we mean when we say that the Mass is *our* sacrifice. Christ at the Last Supper handed himself over as an individual to his Father by his individual act. The Last Supper was Christ's individual sacrifice, and that because it was entirely complete and effective, can never be repeated. But was Christ's will at the Last Supper limited to the individual offering of himself? We shall see, if we consider the purpose of the Supper, that it was not. From Christ's own individual point of view the Supper was unnecessary: his sacrifice on the Cross by which he effectively and freely handed himself over ("Father, into Thy hands I commend my spirit") would of itself have been sacrifice enough to redeem the whole world. Christ's purpose at the Last Supper was to give us his sacrifice, to give us the visible sacrifice that, in the words of the Council of Trent, "the nature of man requires". Now, if sacrifice be essentially the handing over of an offering to God by an effective sign, the only way that Christ could give us his sacrifice was to associate us in some way with his sacrificial will and his sacrificial sign. At the Supper, therefore, Christ gave to his apostles, to his Church, not only his sacrificial sign but also his sacrificial will. When Christ made the sacrifice of himself at the Supper he willed that the handing over which there, at the Last Supper, was his individual offering, should later have associated with it the offering will of his Church. As the unique mediator between man and God he offered individually; as head of the Mystical Body he willed to be offered by the hands of his apostles and their successors to the end of time.

The Mass, Our Sacrifice

In one sense, then, Christ does not offer himself *again* effectively in the Mass, for the effectiveness of the sacrifice of the Mass is provided by the act of the will that he made at the Supper, willing that his sacrifice should be corporate as well as individual. Yet also in a true sense each Mass is *again* an effective offering of Christ because the sign of the sacrifice, the consecration, is not merely an external sign of sacrifice but the expression of Christ's will to offer himself thus corporately. It is so because he willed it to be so when he gave it to us. The Mass adds no new efficacy to the Supper and the Cross, but it is a new form of offering by which Christ willed that his sacrifice should be effectively performed. It differs from Calvary because it contains no physical immolation, and it differs from the Supper (although like the Supper it is a sacrifice in the juridic order) by being Christ's corporate, as distinct from his individual, sacrifice. It differs also in that the Supper received its physical fulfilment the next day on Calvary, whereas the Mass, our sacrifice, looks back to the Cross and cannot be fulfilled again by immolation. It is none the less a complete sacrifice, just as the Supper would still have been a sacrifice even if the immolation of the Cross had not followed.

The Mass is *our* sacrifice actively, because Christ effectively offers through and with us. It is *our* sacrifice passively, because we are effec-

tively offered through and with Christ. We, the Church of Christ, are like him both priest and victim. The priest today, like the apostle yesterday, stands at the altar, and by Christ's sacrificial sign of the double consecration, is the instrument by which the whole Christ, Head and members, offers and is offered to God. This sacrifice will never cease until the Body of Christ reaches its full stature. Thus do we join our will with the will of Christ, our Head, offering ourselves with him to his Father in praise and thanksgiving and in propitiation for our own sins and for those of all the world.

References:

- (1) Abbot Vonier, *A Key to the Doctrine of the Eucharist*. Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1931.
c.f. E. Masure, *The Christian Sacrifice*. Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1944.
- (2) M. de la Taille, S.J., *Mysterium Fidei*. Beauchesne, Paris, 1921. *The Mystery of Faith and Human Opinion*. Sheed and Ward, London, 1930. *Catholic Faith in the Holy Eucharist*, (Summer School of Catholic Studies). Heffer, Cambridge, 1923.
- (3) M. Lepin, *L'Idée du Sacrifice de la Messe d'après les théologiens depuis l'origine jusqu'à nos jours*. Beauchesne, Paris, 1926.
- (4) S. Theol. 2a 2ae, q. 85, art. 3, ad 3.
- (5) S. Theol. loc. cit.

THE UNITY OF SENSE OF THE CAPHARNAUM DISCOURSE

Jn 6, 26-72

GEORGE CROFT, S.J.

EXEGETES who treated of the discourse of Our Lord at Capharnaum were, in the past, and are still to some extent in our own times, unwilling to accept the unity of sense of the whole passage. That the latter part of it (from at least v 51 onwards) refers literally to the Eucharist has, of course, long been the common opinion of Catholic scholars and is supported also by such prominent non-catholic scholars as Cullmann (1) and Dodd (2), although the Council of Trent when making use of the text 6, 58 formulated no explicit condemnation of the spiritual interpretation (reception by faith) of this passage (3). But as regards the earlier part of the discourse (vv 26-50) there has not been the same unanimity. The fathers, as Knabenbauer shows (4), were far from agreeing in their interpretation of v 27 ("Work not for the food which perisheth, but for the food which endureth unto everlasting life."):

Iam quis sit cibus hic permanens in vitam aeternam, qui prosit et perducat ad vitam aeternam eamque efficiat et perenniter satiet, varie concipitur: opera bona (Chr.), fides (Euth.), verbum Dei (Alb. Bon.), eucharistia (Theoph. Corl.), Christum (Aug.), verum et bonum (Cai.), Deum vel bona spiritualia (Thom.).

Again, Bellarmine, so strong a defender of the eucharistic sense of latter part of the discourse, almost takes it for granted that the earlier part does not refer to the same. He says (5):

Non est controversia an in toto capite agatur de eucharistia: constat enim non ita esse. Nam . . . de fide et de incarnatione agitur in magna parte capituli.

Among writers of more recent times, one of the more radical views is taken by Westcott (6) who sees within vv 22-59 no less than three different discourses, each of which is introduced, he says, by "some expression of feeling on the part of those to whom the words were addressed"; a question (v 25), a murmuring (v 41), a contention (v 52). The thoughts successively dealt with are, he urges, distinct; the search after life, the relation of the son of God and Man, and the appropriation by the individual of the incarnate son. He maintains, moreover, the spiritual interpretation throughout.

The most common view among more recent catholic authors who divide the sense of the discourse, is that adopted by Lagrange (7), Battifol, Ruch (8) and others. Their general position is to accept the latter part (vv 48 ff) as referring literally to the Eucharist, while taking the earlier part (vv 26-48) in a spiritual sense. Although, as Goosens points out (9), this latter interpretation would make no substantial difference to the eucharistic teaching to be found in the gospel of St. John, an examination of the not inconsiderable grounds on which it rests, and also the reasons that can be urged on the other side in favour of the unity of sense of the whole passage, is by no means unprofitable. To mention only one consequence: if it can be shown that at no point in this chapter did Our Lord speak of bread figuratively, it would seem to make the literal acceptance of His words and actions at the Last Supper yet more compelling.

The Flesh Profiteth Nothing (v 63)

While, as already stated, the majority of present day exegetes accept the latter part of the discourse as literally eucharistic, such has not always been the case and, in the words of Lagrange, the touchstone of those (especially the Reformers) who defended the spiritual sense of the whole, is v 63: "It is the spirit which gives life: the flesh profiteth nothing". It is urged that at this point Our Lord wished to disillusion those hearers who were thinking in terms of physical eating; after speaking of His own person as the object of faith there comes (in vv 51-59) a temporary introduction of the imagery of eating and drinking, natural enough in a context dealing with spiritual need. But this introduction is metaphorical only, as is shown by the words quoted.

The immediate context, however, of the verse in question indicates that, far from correcting a misunderstanding arising from the imagery He used, Our Lord is in fact insisting that His hearers are indeed to eat His flesh, and that His living flesh. For in v 61 He says, "Doth this scandalise you? What then if ye should behold the Son of Man ascending to where he was before? It is the spirit which giveth life; the flesh profiteth nothing". It is evident from this juxtaposition, as Lagrange points out, that the flesh of which Our Lord is speaking is His own flesh. In this reference to it, He carries His teaching one step further. His hearers had difficulty in accepting His teaching because they imagined that flesh and blood not belonging to a body would have to be their food. But, as St. Augustine says (10):

Non prodest quidquam, sed quomodo illi intellexerunt: carnem quippe sic intellexerunt, quomodo in cadavere dilaniatur, aut in macello venditur — non quomodo spiritu vegetatur.

Christ, risen again to heaven whence He came, will continue to vivify the flesh that they are to receive; it is because He came from, and is to return to heaven, and is hypostatically united to the Word, that this will come about. That flesh, animated with His spirit, is to be the food of the faithful for the life of their souls. Understood thus, this verse not only does not uphold the spiritual interpretation of the discourse at Capharnaum but, as we hope to show, is a further unfolding of the one subject which Our Lord had been treating from the beginning.

Earlier Part Spiritual in Sense?

This exegesis of v 63 however, which Lagrange adopts, does not exclude the acceptance of a spiritual interpretation of the earlier part of the discourse. This is defended by Lagrange because of the recurrent use of the present tense in vv 32, 33 and 35. If Our Lord says "Amen, amen, I say to you, Moses gave you not the bread from heaven, but my Father *giveth* you the true bread from heaven" (v 32); if He says, "For the bread of God is that which *cometh* down from heaven and *giveth* life to the world" (v 33); if again, "he that *cometh* . . . he that *believeth* in me shall never thirst" (v 35), how can He be referring by these words to the Holy Eucharist, not yet instituted? More reasonable, Lagrange considers, to see vv 26-48 as concerning reception of Christ by faith, and a necessary preparation for the literally eucharistic teaching to come later (vv 48ff). In view of this he prefers the textually less well supported reading of the present tense in v 27, taking *didosi humin* instead of *humin dosei* ("food . . . which the Son of Man gives you" rather than "will give you"). It is likely, he thinks, that the future reading here represents a correction made in view of the future gift of the Eucharist.

These uses of the present tense, however, do not, it seems, exclude all possibility of a literally eucharistic sense in that part of the sermon. For in that sense, they would mean that Christ Himself, who is making a promise of His sacramental presence as a food accessible to all, is already present and given by the Father. In other words, the Father gives not only Christ incarnate in whom all must believe, but Christ incarnate who is also the source of life, and food for everlasting life. It would admittedly be more difficult to interpret a present tense in v 27 in this sense, since the Son of Man is here the giver; the Son of Man, it could be argued, was not yet actually giving His body, but promising that gift. But, as Lagrange admits, the future tense is here the better attested reading and while he prefers to reject it for contextual reasons, there seem to be much stronger ones for its retention, when we pass on to consider positively the organic unity of the whole discourse.

Reasons for Unity of the Discourse

This unity is most strongly indicated by the many similarities and even identities of words and phrases recurring within it. These are so numerous and striking that it seems impossible, as Bover says (11), that Our Lord could have intended them to be taken at first spiritually and then realistically. If, with Lagrange, we consider v 48 as the beginning of the turning point of the whole discourse, the occurrence and recurrence before and after this verse of similar and identical phrases can be

listed as shown in the table opposite. (The choice of v 48 is, it should be noted, by no means arbitrary. This is the third time Our Lord affirms that He is the bread of life, and this third time, He goes on to the climax of His teaching. To the gradually elaborated theme of His being the bread of life descended from heaven is now added the fact that this bread is His flesh. There is no break in sense between vv 48 and 52, but a moving forward to the most explicit statement of the eucharistic promise.)

Three phrases, "I am the bread of life" (vv 35 and 48), "I am the (living) bread come down from heaven" (vv 41 and 51) and "I (will) raise him up on the last day" (vv 40b and 54b) occur twice with almost identical wording in each part of the discourse. They could not conceivably have been intended to convey a different truth on each occasion, particularly in view of the difficulty of the doctrine Our Lord was proposing.

The signs of the unity of Our Lord's discourse do not however end there. As Bover has again pointed out (12) in this connection, it is a characteristic of St. John's style and indeed, of the semitic way of exposition, to proceed not so much by logical step as by repetition and the introduction of new elements. A well-known example of this is to be found in the third chapter of St. John where we read in v 3, "Unless a man be born from above, he cannot see the kingdom of God" followed by v 5, "unless a man be born *of water and spirit* he cannot enter into the kingdom of God", where the previous phrase is repeated with the addition of a further elaboration. The same method appears to be used in the discourse under consideration. In the earlier part in vv 31-2 we find, "Our fathers ate the manna in the desert . . . but my Father giveth you the true bread from heaven". Here are contrasted the manna and the bread given by the Father. In the latter part in vv 49-50, the same idea recurs, but with the added element of life, "Your fathers ate the manna in the desert, *and they died*; this is the bread come down from heaven that a man may eat thereof *and not die*". Then again in v 58 the same idea comes again with the addition that this life is everlasting, "not as the fathers ate and died; he that eateth this bread shall live *for ever*." The manna is thus contrasted three times with the bread of life; and each time a new element is added to what Our Lord teaches this bread to be. There is no step from a spiritual to a real sense, but rather a gradual unfolding of the one sense intended throughout.

The Object of Faith

At the outset, in v 29, Our Lord insists on the necessity of faith saying, "This is the work of God that ye believe in him whom he has sent". The object of this faith, Jesus, the bread of life, is then similarly introduced and reintroduced with gradually increasing elaboration. In v 35: "I am the *bread of life*; he that cometh to me shall never hunger, and he that *believeth* in me shall never thirst". Later, the idea of descent from heaven is added to this. In v 41: "I am the bread of life *come down from heaven*". Later again, the climax of the eucharistic promise is reached when Our Lord adds that this bread is His flesh for the life of the world: "I am the bread of life (v 48) . . . come down from heaven

Parallel texts in the Capharnaum Discourse

Earlier Part (vv 27-47)

I am the bread of life (35).

I am the bread come down from heaven (41).

Moses gave you not the bread from heaven, but my Father giveth you the true bread from heaven (32).

For the bread of God giveth life to the world (33b).

For this is the will of my Father, that everyone who beholdeth the Son and believeth in him have everlasting life (40).

. . . that I raise him up on the last day (40b).

Latter Part (vv 48ff)

I am the bread of life (48).

I am the living bread come down from heaven (51).

I am the bread of life. Your fathers ate the manna in the desert, and they died (49).

Not as the fathers ate and died: he that eateth this bread shall live for ever (58).

The bread which I give is my flesh for the life of the world (51b).

He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath everlasting life (54).

. . . and I will raise him up on the last day (54b).

Example of gradual elaboration

Our fathers ate the manna in the desert . . . my father giveth you the true bread from heaven (31-2).

Your fathers ate the manna in the desert, and they died; this is the bread come down from heaven that a man may eat thereof and not die (49-50).

Not as the fathers ate and died; he that eateth this bread shall live for ever (58).

Similar elaboration: object of faith

This is the work of God, that ye believe in him whom he has sent (29).

I am the bread of life; he that cometh to me shall never hunger, and he that believeth in me shall never thirst (35).

I am the bread of life, come down from heaven (41).

I am the bread of life (48).

. . . come down from heaven (50).

(I am the living bread come down from heaven) (51a).

The bread which I will give is my flesh, for the life of the world (51b).

The mystery of the grace of faith

. . . ye have seen me and believe not (36).

All that the Father giveth to me shall come to me, and him that cometh to me I shall in no wise cast out; because I came down from heaven not to do my own will, but the will of him who sent me (37-8).

. . . Is this not Jesus, the son of Joseph? (42).

No one can come to me unless the Father that sent me draw him (44).

. . . but there are among you some that believe not (64).

For this reason, I have said to you, that no one can come to me unless it be given him by the Father (65).

(v 51a) . . . the bread which I will give is *my flesh for the life of the world* (v 51b)". In the following verses (52-8) the fulness of this truth is dwelt upon.

Besides proposing Himself, the bread of life, as the object of faith, Our Lord also on three occasions, each following a manifestation of incredulity, speaks of the mystery of the grace of faith. (For texts, see table.) Two of these occasions (vv 36-8 and vv 42-4) are in the earlier part of the discourse and the third (vv 64-5) is in the latter. Their presence in these places shows again the close-knit internal unity of the whole.

That the audience is differently named at various points (multitude — vv 24-6 ; the Jews — v 41 ; the disciples — v 61) cannot be sufficient evidence for considering, as Westcott did, that the discourse was made up by St. John out of several sermons given on different occasions. The multitude heard; the Jews and the disciples murmured. This does not necessarily make three distinct audiences. That it all took place, moreover, at Capharnaum is sure from vv 24 and 59. Whether or not the whole was uttered in the synagogue there, as seems more likely, or whilst going to it, being in it and leaving it, is a question which does not affect the conclusion that this is *one* discourse, which, because of its evident internal unity, would seem to indicate one audience and one occasion, having as it does, one gradually elaborated subject.

Not only, then, does this solution do justice to the remarkable structure of the discourse, but it affords a closer glimpse of the consummate skill with which Our Lord, adapting His method of teaching to the minds of His hearers, gradually unfolded to them the promise of His presence among them in the Blessed Sacrament.

References:

- (1) cf. O. Cullman, *Les Sacrements dans l'Evangile Johannique*. P.U.F. 1951.
- (2) cf. Dodd, *Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel*. C.U.P. 1954. p. 338.
- (3) Trent: Session 13, Ch. 2 (Denz. 875) cf. also Cavallera, *L'Interpretation du Chapitre vi de S. Jean*, in *Rev. Hist. Eccl.* 10 (1909) 707.
- (4) Knabenbauer, *Comm. in Joann.* 1898. p. 223.
- (5) Bellarmine, *de Eucharistia*. I, 5.
- (6) Westcott, *Gospel of St. John*. 1903. p. 99.
- (7) Lagrange, *L'Evangile selon S. Jean*. 7th Ed. 1948. p. 171.
- (8) Ruch, *L'Eucharistie dans la Sainte Ecriture*. D.T.C. V. 996.
- (9) Goosens, *Les Origines de l'Eucharistie*. 1931. p. 239.
- (10) Quoted by Lagrange, *op. cit.* p. 188.
- (11) Bover, *de Sermonis unitate Joh. 6, 25-59*. *Verb. Dom.* 2 (1922) 48.
- (12) Bover, *ibid.*

THE EUCHARIST, SACRAMENT OF THE RESURRECTION

THOMAS MIDDLEHURST, S.J.

“WHEN this corruptible thing has put on incorruptibility and this mortal thing has put on immortality, then shall come to pass the saying that is written: Death has been swallowed up unto victory (I Cor 15, 24).” These words of St. Paul have not a Eucharistic context, but they express most aptly the theme of this article: the fact of the Eucharist as the sacrament of the resurrection and its theological explanation.

Sacrament of the Resurrection

That the Eucharist is both a guarantee and a cause of corporeal resurrection is clear from scripture, tradition and the documents of the Church. The main scriptural basis is to be found in Our Lord's words: "He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath everlasting life and I will raise him up in the last day (Jn 6, 55)" and it is on these words that Fathers, popes and theologians, from St. Ignatius of Antioch down to Pope Leo XIII, have commented. Thus, for instance, in the writings of the Fathers, the Body and Blood of Christ is variously described as the incorruptible leaven which permeates the corruptible mass, the antidote of immortality, and the seed of eternal life. Or again, the mind of the medieval Church can be illustrated from Innocent III:

"By virtue of this sacrament it becomes possible for those who are of earth to ascend to heaven. For Our Saviour himself said: 'No one ascends into heaven except He who descended, the Son of Man, who is in heaven'. They are one and the same: The Son of God who has come down from heaven: the Son of Man who ascended into heaven: Jesus Christ, to whom are joined, as all the members of a body to its head, all who, through faith in this sacrament, keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace. And as one body, one person, Christ, with His members ascends into heaven and He says with pride and joy, presenting the Church to God: 'This now is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh' and, showing that she constitutes one person with Him, He says: 'They shall be two in one flesh'. This, however, as the Apostle says is a great mystery, both in the Church and in Christ, which the Eucharist symbolises and effects at one and the same time (1)."

Some Theological Explanations

How the Eucharist is the sacrament of the resurrection is not easily explained and there are four main theories to be considered. The first, which maintains that there is some corporeal contact between the body of Christ and our bodies and that some physical quality confers, so to say, a spark of immortality on them, was proposed by Contenson. No one holds this view nowadays so we will not linger over it here.

Suarez and Vasquez, on the other hand, speak of the Eucharist as conferring a title to resurrection and of its effecting a moral relationship and mystical union with Christ. Against this view we may argue, briefly, that a title might be conferred by any sacrament, that no real account is taken of the significance and effectiveness of Christ's humanity and that, unless the words "moral" and "mystical" are further defined, we are left with a sense of evasion of the problem or with a relationship simply in the intentional, juridic order.

De la Taille appeals to the treatise *De Gratia*. He starts from the premise that the soul is the substantial form of the body, modifying and perfecting the same; the soul, in its turn, is perfected in its substantial *esse* by sanctifying grace. Thus, he points out, the body of a Christian is *really* informed by a soul perfected by sanctifying grace. Now, after death, the substantial *esse* of the soul is perfected by glory and communicates that glory to the body it once informed upon earth. Hence our corporeal resurrection is assured by the natural exigency which a glorified soul has to be reunited to the body it once informed during this life. The theory has the difficulty that, if the soul, *qua* glorified substantial form, is the instrumental cause of the glorification of the body, it is not clear why the Eucharist (and not any other sacrament) should have

this particular effect. We will treat of this difficulty later; meanwhile, the exposition of this last explanation suggests a more acceptable answer.

Our Theory

We are, perhaps, merely supplementing de la Taille's view for, according to his theory, the Eucharist modifies the soul; according to ours, it modifies the whole *compositum*. For de la Taille, the modification is effected by the infusion of sanctifying grace; we suggest that this modification is effected by the communication of the preternatural gifts as well. Both preternatural and supernatural perfections are communicated to the whole *compositum* (soul-body) of the communicant since he participates in the capital and fontal human nature of Christ, the head and source of man's restored nature.

When the Son of God became man, the human race was given a new Adam whose function was to restore mankind to the state of original justice which He, the head of redeemed humanity, possessed in its fulness. Now, it is an uncontroverted theme in the New Testament that the human nature of Christ is the restorative instrument of the whole of humanity with respect to body and soul and that this restoration is brought about by the participation of each in Christ our Head. And how do we participate in Christ except through the sacraments? So one may reasonably conclude that the humanity of Christ is the instrument of restoration through the sacraments. Yet the only sacrament where the very humanity of Christ acts and, indeed, effects our participation with Him is the sacrament of the Eucharist. We may reasonably conclude, therefore, that the humanity of Christ is the instrument of restoration through the Eucharist, or, in other words, that, when we communicate, we become sharers in His glorified human nature and heirs to immortal life in union with Christ, our incorruptible Head.

Many of the Fathers (for example, Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria and Gregory of Nyssa) could be cited in our favour but we confine ourselves to the last mentioned who uses the analogy of poison and antidote to this effect:

"But since man alone is made up of a double principle, body and soul, it is necessary that they who are saved should attain, through both principles, unto Him who leads to life . . . For, just as those who have taken poison . . . neutralise the fatal effects with an antidote . . . so, since we have tasted that which destroys our nature, we have urgent need of what reconstitutes and builds up that nature. What, then, is this? It is no other than that body which was shown to be both more powerful than death and the beginning of life . . . Therefore we must receive, in that manner suitable to us, the life-giving power of the Spirit. Since, however, that body alone which God assumed has received this grace, it is plain that our body may not attain to immortality except when, through communion with the immortal, it has become a sharer in its incorruption (2)."

We may also claim the support of St. Thomas in whose works may be found all the principles upon which our theory is based. For example: that the salutary power of Christ flows from His divinity into the sacraments through His humanity (3); that the whole humanity of Christ, soul and body, has an effect on men with respect to both soul and body (4); that nothing achieves participation in any perfection except through the being which is this perfection, through its nature (5).

There is one obvious objection: many will rise again who have never received the Eucharist. How is that reconcilable with this theory? De la Taille says that such people have a *votum Eucharistiae*; we prefer to say that God supplies what the Eucharist actually received would effect, just as He does with those of good faith who are not baptised by water. In this case, the resurrection would still remain the proper and characteristic effect of the Eucharist.

In conclusion a paragraph from the encyclical *Mirae caritatis* of Pope Leo XIII is not inappropriate:

"The august sacrament of the Eucharist is both the cause of glory and beatitude and a pledge, not only for the soul, but also for the body. . . . The divine Victim engenders future resurrection in the ephemeral and corruptible body; for, indeed, the immortal Body of Christ has sown the seed of immortality which one day will burst into flower. The Church has always taught that body and soul will receive this twofold benefit; she follows the affirmation of Christ: 'Qui manducat meam carnem et bibit meum sanguinem habet vitam aeternam; et ego resuscitabo eum in novissimo die'."

References:

- (1) De Sacro Altaris Mysterio, IV, 44. P.L. 217, 886.
- (2) Oratio Catechetica, 37. P.G. 45, 93.
- (3) S. Theol. 3, 62, 5.
- (4) S. Theol. 3, 8, 2.
- (5) In Ephesios, 1, 1.

THE LOGICAL COHERENCE OF PROBABILISM

ELEMÉR NEMESSZEGHY, S.J.

ALTHOUGH moral argument does not lend itself easily to a fully deductive exposition, this does not mean that it is impossible to apply the methods of mathematical logic in particular cases — especially in the demonstration of logical coherence. Here we want to suggest one way in which it can be so used: the investigation of the logical coherence of probabilism.

According to probabilism, where there is question of the lawfulness of an action (not of its validity), one may act according to a truly solidly probable opinion that the action is lawful, even if there is a more solidly probable opinion that the action is unlawful. Clearly there is here no question of that factual probability of an event taking place, admitting degrees to which numbers can significantly be assigned.

1. A moral action is certainly permitted (*de jure*) if it conforms to the law; it is certainly not permitted if it is against the law. In symbols:

11. Cp (certainly permitted action)

12. CNp (certainly not permitted action)

2. If there is a mere probability that an action is permitted, a reason but not a solid reason, then the action is probably certainly permitted or probably permitted (PCp or Pp) and

21. PCp = Pp (logically equivalent)

31. If, however, there is a truly solid reason for holding that an action is permitted, we may say that it is certainly probably permitted: CPp.

32. Again, if there is a more probable reason for holding that an

action is permitted, we may say that it is certainly more probably permitted: $CP + p$.

4. We assume that, if there is not even mere probability that an action is permitted, then the action is certainly not permitted:

$$41. N(Pp) = CNp$$

Also, if an action is not probably permitted (or not probably certainly permitted 21), then there is solid probability that it is not permitted:

$$NPp = CPNp$$

$$\text{or } 42. N(PCp) = CPNp$$

5. To show that probabilism is logically coherent, we have to show that certainly probably permitted is the logical equivalent of certainly permitted, and, against the probabiliorists, that certainly probably permitted *or* certainly more probably permitted is the logical equivalent of certainly probably permitted: that

$$51. CPp = Cp$$

$$52. (CPp \vee CP + p) = CPp$$

6. The proof of 51:

$$PCp = Pp \quad (21)$$

$$N(PCp) = N(Pp) \quad (\text{by negation})$$

$$CPNp = CNp \quad (42 \text{ and } 41)$$

$$Cp = Cp \quad (\text{by substitution})$$

7. The proof of 52. We assume that the more probable involves the probable:

$$71. CP + P \supset CPp$$

$$\text{Now } CPp \supset CPp \quad (\text{identity})$$

$$\text{and } CPp \supset (CPp \vee CP + p) \dots\dots (i)$$

$$CP + p \supset CPp \quad (71)$$

$$\text{and } (Cp + p \vee CPp) \supset CPp \dots\dots\dots (ii)$$

$$\text{hence } (CPp \vee CP + p) = CPp \quad (\text{from } i \text{ and } ii)$$

The logic here used is the modal logic of Lukasiewicz (1) and involves a change of the notion "necessity" to that of "certainty" and of the notion "possible" to that of "probable". The basic axioms (without entering into further technical details) are, in our interpretation, as follows:

1. $+Cp \supset p$ (the certainly permitted involves the permitted)
2. $+p \supset Pp$ (the permitted involves the probably permitted)
3. $-Pp \supset p$ (it is rejected that the probably permitted involves the permitted)
4. $-p \supset Cp$ (it is rejected that the permitted involves the certainly permitted).

(1) **Brief Bibliography:**

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SOME RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE IN SUMMARY AND REVIEW

(i) THE SACRAMENTS

The Sacramental Unity between Christ and the Eucharistic Species. By E. Gutwenger, S.J. (*Summarised from Ztschr. f. k. Theol.* 74(1952) 318, by Philip Loretz, S.J.)

THIS paper is divided into three sections. In the first, the difficulties hitherto encountered in interpreting the sacrifice of the Mass as a *mactatio mystica* are reviewed.

In the second section the author argues from Scripture and Tradition, and from the history of religion, that mactation must be considered an essential part of the eucharistic sacrifice.

The third section is prefaced with a distinction between the primary effect of mactation, i.e. the shedding of blood, and its secondary effect, the death of the victim. The author maintains that only the primary effect is essential to the concept of mactation and he points out that Christ's death cannot be the end of the sacrifice of the Mass, since the glorified Christ is impassible. Furthermore, in the institution of the Mass at the Last Supper, the separate consecration of the bread and wine did not produce this result.

The author then puts forward a solution of the problem based upon an analysis of the dynamic inter-action between substance and accident in the natural order and its application to the relation between Christ and the accidents of bread and wine in the sacramental order. He contends that the continued existence of the accidents of bread and wine is maintained, not by the immediate intervention of God, but through the *habitus operativus* of Christ's substance, and in virtue of *potentia obedientialis*, in the absence of any ontological contradiction in such an association of a substance with accidents alien to it. For this reason, the accidents of bread and wine can in a limited, but real sense be called the sacramental accidents of Christ's Body and Blood, since they depend upon the mediation of the latter for their continued existence. On the Cross, Christ suffered mactation through His natural accidents: on the sacramental plane He undergoes it in *specie aliena*, through the separate consecration of the species of bread and wine. But, in the sense described above, these species can be justifiably considered as real accidents of Christ and hence, on the sacramental plane, Christ undergoes a real mactation.

The objection that both Body and Blood are present under either species alone *per concomitantiam*, is met by a distinction between the physical and sacramental planes. The objection focusses attention on the physical plane, whereas in the Mass the mactation is confined to the sacramental plane and its occurrence on a physical plane is not claimed. It is part of the nature of the sacramental order that real events can take place in it and find their full accomplishment without overstepping its boundaries.

The author acknowledges that his solution depends upon the validity of his description of the accidents of the consecrated bread and

wine as true accidents of Christ in the sacramental order. Only on this assumption does the gap between the sacramental sign (the rite of the separate consecration of the species) and the hidden, signified reality (the real shedding of Christ's Blood from His Body) become closed.

The Sacrament of Restored Nature — St. John Fisher on the Eucharist

By H. P. C. Lyons, S.J. (*Summarised from Clergy Review, 40(1955) 520, by J. L. Hughes, S.J.*)

IN this article Father Lyons draws attention to an often neglected aspect of the sacramental effect of the Eucharist; that, namely, on the Christian's body. Without recognition of this effect religion can become too ethereal and cease to affect human life, personality and love. The Holy Eucharist, however, considered fully in its effects, may symbolise much that is needed for the perfecting of human love.

Father Lyons quotes at length from St. John Fisher who in his *De Veritate Corporis et Sanguinis Christi in Eucharistia* concerns himself with the reality of the corporal presence. This is an apologetic work not a speculative one, like that of Cardinal Mendoza whom he much influenced, and "this in a way gives greater force to what the Martyr has to say, for he is not conscious of suggesting any new theory but simply of putting forward the doctrine of the Fathers".

Fisher's teaching is summed up in these words: "And we believe that not only is the soul refreshed by these mysteries, but our body, too, is recreated also by them . . . Through this food we are so mixed in reality (*re ipsa*) as Chrysostom says, into the flesh of Christ that we are more solidly incorporated into Him: faith and love alone do not effect this, as the same constantly affirms, but the eating of His flesh".

The immortality of our naturally corruptible bodies is explained by the union of our body-soul, our whole human nature, with the body-soul, the whole human nature, of Christ; in virtue of this our bodies are vivified and made incorruptible. For by the Eucharist we are not merely spiritually united to Christ, but in our body and flesh as well (*corporaliter et carnaliter*).

It is this relationship to Christ, Fisher maintains, that not only distinguishes our state from that of the Old Law, but also distinguishes the Eucharist from Baptism and faith informed by charity. Only by the Eucharist are we incorporated into Christ "naturally" and "substantially". In using these two latter terms which were, for him, the heritage of the Fathers, he is indicating a real union as distinct from a moral one; there is no suggestion of our constituting one nature with Christ.

Fisher uses Hilary's argument that neither Christ's union with us nor His union with His Father is a union simply of will, but is a union of nature. But what is of importance to us is that we share by this union in the restored nature which is Christ's. It is to a human nature vivified by its substantial union with the Word that we are united in reality; it is because of this "that our nature becomes, among other things, corporally incorruptible".

Christ's sharing our nature in the Incarnation and our sharing in His restored nature by the Eucharist differ, however, because "through

his incarnation Christ was made flesh, of our flesh and bones. But through this food which he bestows on us . . . we are in reality changed into His flesh, and made His members, of His flesh and bones . . ."

Father Lyons says, "The Eucharist, then, is for John Fisher, the sacrament of Christ's mediatorship; it completes the sharing of the Incarnation by giving us a share, as fruit of the atonement in Christ's perfect humanity, its supernatural and preternatural gifts; and it brings us to union with the Father".

The Nature and Position of the Priesthood. By Jean Beyer. (*Summarised from Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, 76(1954)357, by Benito Blanco, S.J.)

OF the many recent studies of the Sacrament of Orders, Father Beyer's seems the clearest, the most trenchant, the best documented and the most realistic. Whether it is the best founded on theological reasons is another question.

Père Beyer's general stand is as follows: there is only one sacrament of Orders, the priesthood, neither episcopacy nor diaconate being sacraments. He thus dissents from the view so commonly heard that episcopacy contains the fulness of the priesthood, and simple priesthood only a share. On the contrary, simple priests receive the fulness of priesthood, but their exercise of the powers they receive is limited by the Church as regards validity. Thus, a priest is not ordained to be an assistant of the bishop and the priesthood in its sacramental powers has no dependence upon the episcopate as such; the dependence arises, as does the obligation of perfection, from the apostolic mission.

To try to establish his case, Père Beyer appeals to the limitation of the sacramental powers, even as to validity: in the case of bishops as regards valid absolution, in the case of priests, as regards confirmation, the blessing of the holy oils, and as regards Orders, the grant by the Popes to simple priests of power to ordain to subdiaconate, diaconate and even priesthood. Innocent VIII gave Cistercian Abbots power to confer the diaconate on their subjects, Boniface IX gave to the Abbot of St. Osith power even to ordain to the priesthood, as did Martin V to the Cistercian Abbot of Alzelle. Such delegations Père Beyer regards as certainly not sacraments, but only as removing the restriction to the radical power in the one sole sacrament of orders.

Père Beyer appeals, also, to the large number of theologians who have held that episcopacy is not a sacrament but a dignity, an office conferred in a liturgical way, in short, a "sacramental". He insists, however, that the episcopal power of jurisdiction is something quite different from the power of orders and places the bishop in essential superiority to priests. He considers, of course, the definitions of the Council of Trent and finds nothing in them adverse to his view,—which he naturally propounds with due modesty, though with great learning, and submits for further theological discussion.

The most obvious and the gravest difficulty against the theory is that the Church seems to have regarded a bishop's power to ordain as unchangeable and irremovable, which would appear to place the bishop even as regards orders in an essential superiority to simple priests.

Ordination to the Priesthood, by John Bligh, S.J. Sheed and Ward, 1956. 16/-.

IN his preface the author declares his aim as being to meet the needs of students preparing for the priesthood, offering them "a liturgical and theological essay, written in the belief that a careful analysis of the rite will in the end be more conducive to solid piety than a devotional treatment of the subject could be". The belief is well founded; it is typical of the book that it should make live that phrase "Now you are prefigured in those seventy elders"; this parallel between Moses and his helpers and the Bishop ordaining priests to lighten the heavy burden of his office recurs in the rite and is one of the ideas treated by the author in a truly pious way.

The introduction deals more than adequately with the character and powers conferred by the sacrament and sketches the development of the rite as seen in the various Sacramentaries and Pontificals. Naturally the weightiest part of the introduction discusses what has been considered necessary for validity throughout the ages: whether imposition of hands, anointing, tradition of instruments or all these together. With remarkable clarity Fr. Bligh sorts the mass of apparently conflicting evidence, accepting as solution the more common view that the Church can modify the matter and form of the rite of some at least of the sacraments.

The main part of the book is a step by step examination of today's ordination rite, tracing the origin of each ceremony and bringing out the meaning and implications of the prayers and exhortations. Strange facts come to light — the crossing of the stole seems to derive from bishops and priests once wearing two stoles, one from each shoulder, to distinguish them from mere deacons; the difficulty candidates now find in touching both chalice and paten with hands firmly bound may have come from misreading *manibus unctis* as *manibus iunctis*. And, of course, illusions are shattered — probably there never was a time when the Bishop had to begin the ceremony by assuring himself of the fitness of a motley bunch of unknown candidates; the question "Scis illos esse dignos?" would seem always to have been ritual rather than practical. The reviewer had thought the ordination concelebration a relic of apostolic times and was most interested to read of its late and almost accidental introduction. The chalices from which the new priests drink after Communion contain, we know, only wine, but are presented with such ceremony that many a person is deceived — apparently the "deception" is deliberate.

Perhaps this review now seems to suggest that the book is scrappy full of odd tit-bits of information. It is not; the last detail about the wine occurs in one of the passages where the author describes the conscious portrayal of the Last Supper to be found in the ordination Mass. This is one of the attractions of the book, that, while keeping to the historical and theological method he has chosen, the writer yet manages to convey his appreciation of the grandeur of the rite and the greatness of the sacrament.

Ronald Hull, S.J.

The Gospel According to St. John and Early Christian Worship, being Part II of *Early Christian Worship*, by O. Cullmann, translated by A. S. Todd and J. B. Torrence. S.C.M. Press, 1953. 8/-.

THE main interest of this short book which the Protestant theologian, Oscar Cullmann, has devoted to the fourth Gospel is that it gives us an opportunity of looking once more at St. John's Gospel and of finding there new riches.

St. John, according to Cullmann, not only related the events of Christ's life as a historian but also endeavours to prove a thesis: Christ, who was born at Bethlehem and who died on the Cross, is the same person as Christ present in the Church through the sacraments. The words and actions of Christ have, so to speak, a double value or a double significance: they are historical facts which happened in definite circumstances (it is a reassuring factor for the Catholic reader that Cullmann stresses the historicity of the events of the life of Christ), and at the same time they are symbols or prefigurations of Christian rites and sacraments. In the author's own words:

"The implicit assumption of this Gospel is that the historical events as here presented, contain in themselves, besides what is immediately perceptible, references to further facts of salvation with which these once-for-all key events are bound up (p. 56)."

Cullman gives some examples: Christ's baptism, the interview with Nicodemus, the interview with the Samaritan woman, the cure of the cripple at the pool, the cure of the man born blind are all facts which announce or prefigure Christian baptism. There is also a very close connection between the miracle at Cana, the feeding of the five thousand, the discourse at the Last Supper and the Eucharist. Lastly the washing of the feet and the piercing of the side of Christ with the lance symbolise both Baptism and the Eucharist.

Many of Cullmann's analyses are traditional and come straight from the Fathers, but his thesis is new, at least in its expression, and certainly helps us to discover a symbolical background in St. John's Gospel. Reserves, however, should be made on two points at least. Cullmann seems to admit two sacraments only, Baptism and Eucharist and does not make even one allusion to the other sacraments. In his narrative of Christ's baptism (p. 65, cf. also p. 80) Cullmann writes that at that precise moment the Holy Ghost entered Christ's soul and remained with him. Does he mean that Christ is God only after his baptism? These reserves, important as they are, do not destroy Cullmann's main argument and his work will be useful to those who desire a better understanding of St. John's Gospel.

Gabriel Ramel, S.J.

An Approach to the Theology of the Sacraments, by Neville Clark. S.C.M. Press, 1956. 8/-.

THE main interest of this work lies in the closeness of approach to Catholic sacramental theology which can be made by an examination of Baptism and Holy Eucharist in scripture. At the same time it shows (in contrast, say, to Fr. Leeming's recent work) that such examination can give no more than an approach.

The author connects both sacraments very closely with the sacrifice of Calvary which, following Christ's reference to His passion and death as a baptism, is made the prime analogate of all Christian Baptism. He considers that "the New Testament view of Baptism is of a rite that is effective rather than merely symbolic" and that the gift of the Holy Spirit (always for him in Baptism) "involves a radical change at the centre of man's being". He is, however, owing to his rejection of the historicity of the dominical command in Mt 28 and his doubts about Christ's baptism by John, in difficulties with the explanation of the development of Christian Baptism. This he attributes to the reflection of the early Church upon the theological significance of Christ's baptism by John, coupled with an instinctive imitation of a traditional Jewish rite of initiation.

His treatment of the Eucharist is, with certain reservations, more satisfactory. In particular, he has some stimulating remarks on what a commemorative act meant to the Jews which help to the understanding of Christ's command at the Last Supper. Again, on the significance of the Eucharist, he shows how, by partaking of the Eucharist which is the Body of Christ, the Christian shares in the life of the risen Lord and the Church becomes the (mystical) Body of Christ and how the idea of communion in sacrifice is basic to the Eucharist.

The eschatological note is sounded throughout and, in the last chapter, after a caution against starting from *a priori* definitions of sacraments, he sees them, in the light of the scriptures, as the means of a new creation which nevertheless looks forward to its final realisation in glory, when the Lord who redeemed the world comes in His glory.

William F. Forrester, S.J.

(ii) SCRIPTURE

Enchiridion Biblicum. Documenta ecclesiastica Sacram Scripturam spectantia auctoritate Pontificiae Commissionis de re biblica edita. Editio secunda aucta et recognita. Rome, Arnoldo, 1954. xvi+279 pp.

THE second edition of this excellent source-book is of considerable interest because it contains some important differences from the first. While five of the documents originally included have been omitted because they were considered to be of less importance now, twenty-two new documents have been added. Among the ninety documents collected in the *Enchiridion*, the fourteen replies of the Pontifical Biblical Commission enjoy a significant place.

The changes from the first edition revive the once burning question of the exact juridical value of these documents. A thorough examination of the *Enchiridion* leads to two conclusions (1). The decrees are generally not presented as unalterable and definitive, but are relative to the content of contemporary biblical research. Thus a negative answer to a question whether certain arguments in favour of an opinion should be considered definitive does not imply that the opinion is to be rejected once and for

all, but only until it is rendered acceptable by sounder arguments. Moreover, when Catholic scholars have discovered sufficiently strong reasons for departing from the letter of the replies, the Biblical Commission has not felt itself bound to prevent them doing so. The existence of recent and almost simultaneous notes by the Secretary and Pro-Secretary of the Biblical Commission (2) on the new *Enchiridion* gives outstanding confirmation to the above estimate of the value of the replies. Both these writers are perfectly aware of the authority conferred by their official status on their carefully worded comments.

They make it clear that the *Enchiridion* has an apologetic value in showing the Church as the watchful guardian of the Scriptures; it is valuable also, and more specially, for the history of dogma. Both Fr. Miller and Fr. Kleinhans further point out that two periods may be clearly distinguished in the recent history of Scripture scholarship and that we ought not to forget the difficulties which the Church had to face in the first of these. It is hard now to understand the tremendous difficulties Catholic scholars had to overcome fifty years ago; they were confronted by opponents whose attitudes of mind were induced by the attacks of Rationalism and they laboured under the inadequacy of methods of Biblical study to meet such attacks successfully. These dangers have now passed; but it would be unwise to blame the Biblical Commission for issuing restrictive replies in these abnormal conditions.

Today Catholic scholars, in the use which they make of literary or historical criticism, enjoy full freedom of research; and the authors of the above-mentioned notes make a point of saying that this is true notwithstanding the decrees of the Biblical Commission, unless questions of Faith or morals are at issue. Here the authors are, in the opinion of Dom Dupont, echoing the liberal principles laid down in *Divino Afflante Spiritu* by Pius XII saying: "There consequently remain many matters, and important matters, in the exposition and explanation of which the sagacity and ingenuity of Catholic interpreters can and ought to be freely exercised . . ."

In judging the replies of the Biblical Commission issued in the earlier period we must consider them, therefore, in their historical context and we must bear in mind whether their character is normative or dogmatic.

Alfredo Quevedo, S.J.

(1) See J. Dupont, O.S.B., A propos du nouvel *Enchiridion Biblicum*, *Revue Biblique*, 62 (1955) 414ff. The article is from an authoritative scholar.

(2) A. M(iller), *Das neue biblische Handbuch*, *Benediktinische Monatschrift* (Beuron), 31 (1955) 49-50.

A. Kleinhans, *De nova Enchiridii Biblici editione*, *Antonianum*, 30 (1955) 63-5.

Le Travail d'Édition des Fragments Manuscrits de Qumrân. (*Summarised from Revue Biblique*, 63(1956)49, by George Croft, S.J.)

THE paper, here summarised, is a report on the progress that has been made in deciphering and editing Mss. and fragments found in the Qumrân region since 1951. In the late Summer of that year, the Ta'âmrés, the Bedouins responsible for the original discovery in 1947, made further finds in caves at Wady Murabba'at, a point on the western

shore of the Dead Sea a few miles south of Qumrân. The next year the same group located a second cave, 2Q, at Qumrân, upon which a systematic exploration of the whole cliff face there was carried out by Father de Vaux, O.P. and his collaborators. This led to the discovery of cave 3Q where the now well known copper rolls were found. In September 1952, the same Bedouins discovered a fourth cave: further exploration that Autumn located two more, and in an expedition in the Spring of 1955 four more were found, making ten in all.

Several public bodies have been involved in the purchase of the very considerable quantity of documents and fragments which the Bedouins had already found in these places. Apart from the small quantity of fragments bought by private individuals, all purchased Mss. as well as those yielded by the exploration of the caves, are gathered in the Palestine Archaeological Museum in Jerusalem, whence will be carried out the work of their study and publication. Only when this work is complete will the fragments be dispersed into the separate keeping of their various purchasers. The work of both field exploration and buying of further fragments is being directed by Father de Vaux.

A series of volumes entitled *Discoveries in the Judaean Desert* is being prepared, and is to be published by O.U.P. The first volume dealing with the Ms. fragments and other remains found in 1Q in 1947 has already appeared and subsequent volumes will be after the same pattern.

Harding, de Vaux, Barthélemy and Milik direct the work of preservation and identification at present going on in Jerusalem. After them, a large team of scholars is at work, nine of whom, here present progress reports on their work on the groups of fragments assigned to them. The editor of the symposium comments on the difficulties of their task. They are dealing with materials which are, on arrival, in anything but legible condition, and have to be cleaned, unfolded and flattened under glass sheets, after being softened by water vapour. Infra-red photography is immediately applied, both in order to record detail which would escape ordinary scrutiny and to forestall further breakages. Only when all this is done can the work of reading and fitting together really begin.

It is hardly surprising then that in the detailed reports that follow there are, as yet, few major conclusions to be drawn concerning the many problems that the Qumrân discoveries present. Greatest interest will evidently centre round the finds in 4Q, the most considerable made in recent times. Of the international and interconfessional group of scholars at work on these, F. Cross, Jnr. reports on more than one Hebrew biblical fragment whose textual affinities are to the LXX rather than the Massoretic text. In the group of biblical and non-biblical texts from 4Q assigned to J. Allegro are fragments of commentaries of four books of the OT including Isaiah. In those assigned to Milik, Strugnell and Hunzinger are fragments which fill out missing sections in some of the major works (complete scrolls) found in 1Q; for example the *War* and the *Manual of Discipline*.

These few unconnected facts, selected from the reports in this paper, serve at least to indicate the importance of the evidence that is yet to come to light from the editing of the fragments.

Les Manuscrits du Désert de Juda, by G. Vermès. Desclée, 1953. 220 pp.

THIS scholarly work presents a French translation of the chief MSS., together with an ample and learned introduction. The texts, all of which relate to the life of the Qumrân community, are a Commentary on Habbacuc, The Manual of Discipline, The War of The Children of Light against The Children of Darkness, Hymns of Thanksgiving, and a fragment celebrating the victory of justice over impiety.

The now familiar story of the original discovery is told once again, with the difference that M. Vermès is at pains to give an exhaustive description and documentation. On the problem of the age of the MSS., which has provoked a veritable *guerre des savants*, the author is understandably reluctant to commit himself with perfect precision, but inclines to the view that they belong to the period 100 B.C.- 50 A.D.

A careful discussion follows in which the aims, organisation, government and initiation ceremonies of the Qumrân community and three other sects are compared and contrasted. The difficulties against a facile identification of the Qumrân group with the Essenes are frankly discussed, the author finally taking the view that the Qumrân community in spite of apparent differences were in fact a branch of the Essenes.

Whereas the available MS. evidence, in conjunction with our knowledge of Jewish history, does permit the author tentatively to identify the Wicked Priest of the Commentary with Simon Maccabee, he does not attempt to settle the precise messianic beliefs of the sect, nor the extent to which they regarded the Teacher of Righteousness as Messiah. That this reserve, not shared by all scholars, is amply justified is shown by the firm challenge from de Vaux to the recent rather speculative excesses on that subject by Professor Allegro.

In conclusion one must commend the clearness of exposition, the scholarship of the author, and the care with which his work is documented and illustrated.

George Croft, S.J.

The Scrolls from the Dead Sea, by Edmund Wilson. W. H. Allen, 1955. 10/6.

THE scrolls have caused a sensation in the theological world and Mr. Wilson's book meets the demand of the ordinary layman for an outline of the nature of that sensation and the reasons for it. Certainly the author is not given to under-statement: "The discovery," he says with Dr. Albright, "bids fair to revolutionize our approach to the beginnings of Christianity". Again, the theology of the Dea Sea sect obviously extends to the New Testament and beyond, making even the *Didache* and *Hermas* at last intelligible; the doctrines of baptism, of the Living Water, of the Sacred Meal, of the Two Ways (of Goodness and Evil, Light and Darkness) have their prototypes in the sect's literature. Indeed, if we are to believe M. Dupont-Sommer of the Sorbonne, who follows in the footsteps of Renan, even the suffering Christ had His prototype in the sect. For both Christ and the Teacher of Righteousness were the Elect of God and Messiah, and at odds with the Sadducees; both pronounced

judgement on Jerusalem for putting the Messiah to death; both founded a Church which was based on communion in Love and which was to await the Messiah's glorious return, etc.

True, Mr. Wilson shows that not all scholars accept M. Dupont-Sommer's reconstruction of the gaps in the text with phrases which support his theory. But M. Dupont-Sommer, he thinks, has an uncanny way of being right even when his arguments are based on wrong texts. It is the daring speculations of the left wing that delight the author; the caution of the orthodox he finds less attractive. He notices "a certain nervousness" in Churchmen and Jews in grappling with the subject of the scrolls: in the Jews, because they fear for the authority of the Massoretic text; in Christians, because they feel that "the uniqueness of Christ" has been called in question. Only the pure scholars are unembarrassed. He quotes Dr. Flusser of Prague with evident satisfaction: "Les chrétiens sont dérangés; les juifs sont dérangés aussi. Moi, je ne suis pas dérangé."

And again,

"C'est très désagréable pour tout le monde, sauf pour ceux qui s'occupent des apocalypses — ils sont contents."

However, he respects the scholarship, the acuteness, the cool objectivity of the Churchmen, but does not notice that, for Catholics, however much Christianity may have "inherited" from the sect, the fact that our Lord was divine, and therefore unique, is in no way affected.

While he accepts a pre-Christian date for the scrolls, the author mentions in passing that eminent scholars like Dr. Driver date them many centuries after Christ. But he does not state the real difficulties facing the theorists: if Christianity grew naturally out of the Essene doctrines, how are we to explain, for example, the sacrament of matrimony (since the Essenes were devoted, at least in the main, to celibacy), the sacred use of oil (since oil was considered defiling), the fact that Christ and the Apostles worshipped in the Temple (since the Essenes were in schism), to say nothing of the complete abrogation of the Mosaic Law?

None the less, there is never a dull page: events and persons connected with the discovery of the scrolls are colourfully described, and the new problems presented with dash. As an introduction to the subject, this short book must be one of the best things available.

John Berrell, S.J.

(iii) APOLOGETICS

New Essays in Philosophical Theology, edited by Anthony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre. S.C.M. Press Ltd., 1955. 21/-.

THIS series of essays is the first publication of a new *Library of Philosophy and Theology*, a library whose aim is to inform the general reader of contemporary work in theology and philosophy in Great Britain and the Continent.

The *ancilla* of theology has often displayed an independent spirit, but at least she has considered theology to be worth the compliment of

contradiction. In this series of essays Philosophy, as represented by some of her contributors, doubts whether Theology says anything sufficiently significant to allow of contradiction.

Half the contributors are Christian, and all may loosely be termed positivist, in the sense that they all consider the primary object of philosophy to consist, not in the discovery of profound truths about the universe, but in the investigation of the logic of language, in the study and classification into categories of the meaning and behaviour of the words we use. Philosophy seems to have reached its nadir when she proposes logic-chopping and word indexing as her primary aim. Yet such a programme is not so ridiculous as it might appear at first sight. Philosophical and theological problems must be formulated in language and language can be dangerous misleading. In trying to answer questions it is essential to know, as far as possible, what precisely is the problem and it often happens that what appears to be a problem about reality turns out to be a problem about language. A foreign visitor, for example, after a tour of all the Oxford colleges might ask his guide where the University is to be found. His problem sounds like an empirical one, in fact it is linguistic.

In these essays theological language and problems are subjected to logical analysis, at least that is what is intended. The series includes an essay on God's existence by J. J. Smart, being an examination and rejection of the ontological argument as expounded by St. Anselm and Descartes, and of St. Thomas' argument from contingency and design. Smart rejects the contingency argument because there is nothing impossible in the notion of an infinite series of contingent beings, and because the notion of a necessarily existing God is a logical absurdity. The explanation he gives of this is interesting, for it illustrates a failing common to many of the contributors: their arbitrary assumption of certain axioms. In this case the assumption is that the term *necessary* can only properly be applied to propositions, not to things, and that only those propositions can be necessary which are also tautological. It follows from this that no necessary (i.e. tautological) proposition can make any assertion about existence; but the proposition *God necessarily exists* attempts to do so, therefore it is a logical absurdity. In this argument it is taken for granted that there can be no other necessity than logical necessity which, of course, rules out God's existence *a priori*.

There is an essay by J. N. Findlay on the possibility of disproving the existence of God, which shows logical analysis at its extravagant worst. The author concludes that God's existence can be disproved but he is ably criticised in the two essays which follow. An important series of four essays occupies the middle of the book and contains the central problem which recurs in most of the other contributions. The problem is best illustrated in the parable given by Flew and developed from an article by John Wilson entitled *Gods* (Logic and Language, First Series, ed. Flew). Two explorers come upon a clearing in the jungle which contains flowers and weeds. One explorer is a believer and asserts that there must be a gardener; the other denies the necessity. They set guard, surround the clearing with barbed wire, patrol with bloodhounds, but no

gardener appears. The believer begins to qualify his assertion: the gardener must be invisible, intangible, noiseless and scentless. He persists in his belief and will allow nothing to count against it. So it is with religious people. They assert that God loves men but will allow nothing to count against the assertion, therefore their assertion is vacuous and indicates no existent state of affairs. Such assertions are merely ways of looking at the world; they tell us nothing about the world. There are three essays in answer to this problem, the last by I. Crombie being particularly good in its clear illustration of the arbitrariness of the positivist demands upon theological statements. The problem of the meaning to be attached to statements about God recurs in an essay by Flew on Divine omnipotence and human freedom where he argues that if God is omnipotent and if human freedom is not incompatible with inability to choose evil, then God must be accessory before, after, and during the fact of every moral and physical evil that occurs. There is, therefore, either a contradiction in the notion of an all-perfect God, or else the phrase is meaningless. Miracles are considered in another essay by Flew and he concludes that they can never be known as signs of Divine intervention. There are no hard and fast scientific laws, only hypotheses, therefore no event can be labelled as supernatural but only as beyond the scope of present hypotheses. If the supernatural is utterly different from the natural then we are unable to investigate it at all. If it is not utterly different from the natural then it cannot be invoked as an explanation of the unusual. The traditional arguments for immortality are considered in two essays on death by D. M. Mackinnon and Flew, and the arguments are rejected as not giving a sufficiently clear account of what constitutes personal identity. There is one essay "Demythologising and the problem of validity" by R. Hepburn who argues that existentialism has become Bultmann's master, not his servant, for it arbitrarily imposes limits upon critical examination of doctrine and documents.

If existentialism has become Bultmann's master, not his servant, logical analysis has become the master, not the servant, of some of the contributors to the series. They do not say that they shall be as Gods but they do imply that God shall conform to their specifications; because He does not, they therefore conclude that theology is, after all, an utterly unsubstantial creature, a ghost of the imagination, or at least an irrational creature with whom philosophers *qua* philosophers can have no dealings, though for philosophers as men theology may still have an inexplicable charm.

There are no Catholic contributors to the series. One Catholic was asked to contribute to a previous publication but was unwilling to have it reprinted in this series. Though half the contributors are Christian, the non-Christian contributions predominate and some of them are irritating in their pompous stupidity, e.g. "And I for my part should be willing to accord to my *Focus imaginarius* that same attitude of unquestioning reverence that my critics accord to their existent God; it is, in fact, because I think so highly of certain ideals that I also think it unworthy to identify them with anything existent" (J. N. Findlay p. 74). However it is a stimulating book and though the problems which it poses are by no means new — the problem of analogy and of evil — yet they are got up

in a new dress and forcibly expressed. The theologian cannot afford to ignore and dismiss linguistic analysis as just another symptom of twentieth century madness.

Gerard Hughes, S.J.

Modern Science and Christian Beliefs, by Arthur F. Smethurst. Nisbet, 1955. 21/-.

CANON SMETHURST makes no attempt to deduce a synthesis of Revelation and reason based on metaphysical premises, since many scientists and philosophers do not accept such an approach. The book is divided into three parts. In the first, the author shows that the three presuppositions of modern science viz. "belief in the orderliness of the universe", "belief of the principle of causality or intelligibility in the natural world" and "belief in the reliability of human reason" fit very well with the belief in one rational God who governs the universe. In the second part, he exposes with great clarity the different modern theories of physics, biology and psychology and shows how the quantum theory and recent developments of the theory of evolution emphasise the divine activity. He explains, further, how the influence of the biochemical, physiological and psychological factors on personality shows the essential unity of the individual and how this harmonises with the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. The third part is a discussion of the problems connected with miracles and dogma. There are four appendices on logical positivism, dialectical materialism, existentialism and the attempts of Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Heim to solve the problem of how to communicate the Christian Gospel in a scientific age.

Despite the author's reasons for avoiding philosophical precision, his method has serious disadvantages. His notion of belief is woolly. Belief in the principle of causality is quite different from belief in the Incarnation. Again, the author attempts to apply the Hegelian dialectic to the doctrine of the Trinity. It is obvious that here is no question here of a dialectical process because, in the dialectical process, thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis are, in fact, different periods of a real evolution. Similarly, the refutation of logical positivism, based on the difference between scientific and theological languages, is not acceptable because the laws of logic must hold equally well for scientific and theological analyses.

Apart from this the problem is treated with a scientific objectivity. Its great merit is that it does not shrink from discussing:

"the general aspects of a great subject over a wide field for fear of being convicted of ignorance or error in the specialised details of a particular part of it."

Elemér Nemesszeghy, S.J.

The Shrine of St. Peter and the Vatican Excavations, by Jocelyn Toynbee and John Ward Perkins. Longmans, Green and Co., 1956. 42/-.

THIS book is based for the most part on the Report of the Vatican excavations under St. Peter's. It is written not only for the archaeological student but also for the general reader. In the first part of the book, after a general description of the Vatican area in classical times, three of the main mausoleums are discussed in detail and the thirty-two

plates illustrate their bearing on the art and architecture of the time, both Christian and pagan. The mausoleums are dated from 125 A.D. to the end of the second century, though some individual graves may have been earlier and the cemetery itself was still in use in the fourth century.

The second part of the book deals with the shrine of St. Peter on the Vatican which is referred to by Gaius (c. 200). It presumably marked the Apostle's grave, as does the Confession today. This pre-Constantinian shrine is discussed in careful detail and with excellent diagrams, which bring out the significance of the graves round the shrine at their different levels. The position of the shrine makes reasonable the hypothesis that it marks the grave of St. Peter. How otherwise explain that the slope of the Vatican Hill, which presented such engineering difficulties, was chosen for the site of Constantine's Basilica? Besides, its construction involved the violation of a pre-existing cemetery, which was severely forbidden by Roman law, and contrary to public sentiment.

There follows an account of the various changes in the shrine of St. Peter up to the present day, with special reference to its sack by the Saracens in the ninth century. The epilogue shows the important influence of St. Peter's, old and new, on the art and architecture of Western Europe.

Since the book is explicitly written from the archaeological point of view, many of its conclusions may seem to be over tentative or negative. Thus the authors consider as unproven, in spite of some impressive evidence, the tradition that the shrine on the Via Appia (the church of San Sebastiano) once held the bones of the Apostles. On the other hand the authors deplore, not without reason, the fact that no scientific statement concerning the bones discovered under the shrine some four years ago, has yet been made. So that, where the body of St. Peter was originally buried, and where it is now, both remain open questions. But that the Vatican shrine was venerated from the middle of the second century is an indisputable fact.

The caution shown by the authors throughout this work is a guarantee of reliability, for they never go beyond the evidence, and present other theories with great care and courtesy. Their work can be recommended unreservedly; and though the first, and as yet, the only one in English on this subject, it may well rank among the best in any language.

Peter Whittall, S.J.

(iv) THE SOCIETY OF JESUS

Note sur les Origines de l'Obéissance Ignatienne. By P. Blet, S.J.
(Summarised from *Gregorianum*, 35(1954)99, by Michael Flannery, S.J.)

THE author maintains that the gradual process by which St. Ignatius and his companions arrived at the full practical realisation of their ideal is of capital importance in the interpretation of St. Ignatius' doctrine of religious obedience. There is the main fact, essential for any accurate interpretation, that five years passed after St. Ignatius and his companions had first vowed to place themselves at the service of the

Pope and to devote their lives to the apostolate before they decided to bind themselves by vows of obedience and acquiesced in the consequent formation of a religious order. Ignatian obedience must, therefore, be interpreted in the light of the ideal which led the companions to enter on their original association.

The author distinguishes three stages in the gradual progress. The first stage, lasting from the stay at Manresa until the vision at La Storta, is characterised by the absence of any precise idea of obedience. We have it on the authority of Nadal and Mercurian that St. Ignatius said that God disclosed to him the form and plan of the Society in the Exercise of the Two Standards which he made at Manresa. The ideal expressed in that Exercise is central to the Constitutions and to the Institute.

The second stage is marked by the adoption of the method which seemed to fulfil this ideal most perfectly. The general mission to spread the gospel comes from Christ, the particular mission will be received most surely from the Church in the person of the Pope, Christ's vicar on earth. Accordingly the companions offered their services to Paul III in 1538. The first Summary of the Institute, the Formula of the Institute and the Constitutions (Part IV ch. 1A) lay down that the service of the Pope as the vicar of Christ in the preaching of the gospel is the purpose of the Society's existence. The ideal of obedience to the Pope was not substituted for the ideal contained in the Two Standards. To St. Ignatius obedience to the Pope and the service of Christ were one and the same thing.

The third stage was reached in 1539 when it became apparent that the common ideal of obedience to the Pope which united the companions was shortly to be the cause of their dispersion. They had now to decide whether, in spite of the distances separating them, they were to remain united by membership of a stable religious organisation. They had little difficulty in settling this question. They were more hesitant about constituting themselves a religious order. When they decided to do so, they were at pains to safeguard the prerogative they had promised to the Pope by reserving to him the power of assigning to the members their particular field of apostolate. The General's powers were to be exercised in all matters that concerned the rules. The growth of the Society made it impracticable for the Pope to allot their tasks to individuals and about 1542 the request was made and granted that the power of sending members of the Society to Catholic regions should be delegated to the General. Further growth brought the further delegation of the power of sending the members to missionary countries. In the Constitutions (Part VII ch. II n. 1) these powers are still described as delegations conceded by the Pope for practical reasons.

St. Ignatius and Cardinal Pole. By Joseph Crehan, S.J. (*Summarised from Commentarii Ignatiani 1556-1956: Archivum Historicum Societatis Jesu, 15(1956)72, by Philip Leonard, S.J.*)

THE research undertaken for this representative contribution of the Province to the *Commentarii Ignatiani* has already given us the successful Third Programme broadcast of July 1955 for which Fr. Crehan

was able to use some hitherto unpublished matter on Cardinal Pole's negotiations for the restoration of Church property seized under Henry VIII. In this essay, apart from showing that the Cardinal's relations with the Society and St. Ignatius in particular were often to their mutual advantage, the author endeavours to throw some light on the mystery surrounding the absence of Jesuits from England at a time so full of promise, as it then appeared, for the restoration of the old faith under Queen Mary.

Through John Helyar, parish-priest and tutor to the Pole family and author of the earliest manuscript copy of the *Spiritual Exercises* still extant, an attempt is made to trace the Cardinal's first introduction to the *Exercises* and to their author. It is, however, in the judicious presentation of evidence from various letters from St. Ignatius, that there is clearly revealed a friendship founded not only on mutual regard but also on a mutual anxiety for the spiritual welfare of England. If the case has not been proved for direct influence by St. Ignatius on the Cardinal's spiritual life, nevertheless there is revealed a remarkable affinity of spirit between them and that the Cardinal held the Society in high esteem is fully established. This esteem he expressed most actively and especially in the part he played in the granting by Julius III of the Bull *Exposcit debitum* in confirmation of the Institute and Fr. Crehan considers it almost certain that it was through Pole's persuasion that Ignatius saw fit to add the words "*ad fidei defensionem*" to the *Formula Instituti*. In a letter to Ignatius, thanking him for the services of Bobadilla, the familiar tone of the letter (signed by Pole "*uti frater*") seems to indicate that they must have met many times. There were ample opportunities for them to meet for between 1535 and 1541 both were in Venice and Rome at the same period. Pole was *Custos* of the English Hospice (of which John Helyar was Master at the time) and not the least of the many facts of interest in this essay is that referring to the thesis *Praeformatio reformationis Tridentinae de seminariis clericorum* by Fr. V. P. Brassel, S.J. In his preparation of this thesis, the latter discovered a document which reveals Pole's desire to turn the Hospice into a school for the sons of the English nobility because he considered that the Church's collapse in England was due largely to the scant regard of the nobility for the bishops' humble origins. This document is here published for the first time as an Appendix to the essay and reveals besides that the traditional Oxford-Cambridge rivalry extended in those days far beyond the playing fields and the river.

As to the mystery of the absent Jesuits, Fr. Crehan hints that Spanish intrigue against the Society, the preoccupation of both King Philip and Pole with very tricky political negotiations, the failure of either to give an express invitation to the Society pressed for by both Ignatius and Francis Borgia and commented upon most severely by Lainez and last but not least, the strange case of Ribadeneira's protracted delay at Brussels before setting out to take up his commission in England when it was already too late (Ribadeneira appears not to have been *persona grata* with Pole at this time)—all go to explain, at least in part, this mystery offered to historians for so long without solution.

(v) OTHER QUESTIONS

Die Reform des Trienter Konzils im Spiegel der Andachtsliteratur. By Aloys Schrott, S.J. (*Summarised from Das Weltkonzil von Trient. Vol. 1, p. 349ff, edited by Georg Schreiber, Herder, Freiberg, 1951, by Philip Loretz, S.J.*)

THIS paper deals with the effects of the Tridentine reform upon subsequent devotional literature, though the author points out the difficulty of completely disentangling the influence of the conciliar decrees in themselves from that exercised by the leaders of the Catholic Reformation, which long ante-dated the Council itself and provided its chief inspiration.

In comparison with the fervent, and intimate prayers and the Books of Hours of the Middle Ages, post-Tridentine piety is starkly sober and largely non-liturgical. Its method is that of the purgative rather than the unitive or illuminative ways. Its chief emphasis is placed upon practical means for the reform of personal conduct (e.g. meditation, daily examination of conscience and frequent confession) and the inculcation of sound religious knowledge based upon precise dogmatic formulae. Its aim is to restore and preserve the first essentials of religious life rather than to plumb its full depths. Hence the catechism becomes part of the prayer book, or the latter becomes an appendage of the former; and the characteristic Acts of Faith, Hope, Charity and Contrition make their appearance.

Nevertheless, the exigencies of theological controversy sometimes led to a somewhat onesided presentation of doctrinal truths. The new heresies spread widely and rapidly so that post-Tridentine devotional literature necessarily aimed at a large circulation and an immediate appeal, with the consequent sacrifice of depth to simplicity and clarity. Thus to combat Luther's denial of a sacrificing priesthood and to stress the difference between the priesthood and the laity, the use of the Roman Rite and the Latin language were made obligatory for liturgical purposes. As a result the Mass became more and more a sacred drama at which the laity assisted and piously meditated upon, rather than a common act of oblation in which they actively participated. Again, Holy Communion tended to become dissociated from the Mass in the minds of the laity and to become coupled with Confession, both being looked upon as remedies for sin and sinfulness, rather than as ways to union with Christ.

In the post-Tridentine period the people's desire for common prayer in the vernacular found expression in the rise and popularity of the Litanies, and in devotion to the Rosary. Processions, pilgrimages, and membership of religious confraternities, founded upon the old guilds, provided further substitutes for closer participation in the liturgy, while other devotions such as Exposition of the Blessed Sacrament and the Forty Hours Prayer developed about the same time.

This new devotional trend, the main features of which have persisted into our own times, gave an enormous impulse to personal reform, to the practice of prayer and to devotion to the Sacraments, while its

insistence on sound and definite religious knowledge paid handsome dividends in protecting the large mass of the faithful from the errors of Quietism, Jansenism and Rationalism in succeeding centuries.

These great achievements more than outweighed whatever was lacking in post-Tridentine piety in depth and richness. Even to-day, when we are once more returning to the liturgy as an inexhaustible fount of inspiration, we cannot afford to dispense with many features of post-Tridentine devotion lest we ourselves fall into modern errors of Humanism, Quietism and false mysticism.

The Bridge: A Yearbook of Judaeo-Christian Studies, edited by John M. Oesterreicher. Pantheon Books Inc. 1956. 346 pp.

POPE PIUS XI has well said: "Abraham is called Our Father. Spiritually, we are Semites"; and it is to a search into the many implications of these words that this and the succeeding volumes of "*The Bridge*" are devoted. The Church bears ever in mind that the Rock on which she stands is embedded in the revealed wisdom of prophets and patriarchs alike, and in the marvellous witness that history bears to the destiny of Israel. For her the past is not dead, but in a sense lives on; and the past must be pressed into service, if Israel is to be saved. Thus it is that the wonders of days gone by will be called to mind repeatedly in these pages.

The volume to hand makes good reading. It comprises essays on a wide variety of subjects, each and all subscribing to a unity of purpose. Many of us will at once be drawn to "Abraham and the Ascent of Conscience" by Raissa Maritain, a stimulating essay, giving food for thought. The Abbot of Downside brings his erudition to bear on the gospel according to Matthew, and the questions to which it gives rise. "The Protocols of Zion" are ably exposed by Pierre Charles, S.J. These notorious calumnies have long been given the lie; but in their day they worked the Jews much harm. So any attempt to redress the balance is welcome; for, in spite of exposure, calumny dies hard.

The editor broaches the task of discussing Simone Weil, and the fruit of his work is an understanding essay, at once informative and delicate, and full of perspicacity. It is common ground that this valiant and gifted woman stood at the point of contact between Christianity and Judaism; but it is less well known how sadly lacking she was in the true understanding of Jesus, how apt to cite the Scriptures to the wrong purpose, or twist them to her own. Although spiritual in the extreme, her actions seemed to be redolent of self. Yet the story of this brave woman cannot but move us to admiration and pity. For, while serving God incessantly, and holding aloof from the Church, there can be no doubt that she loved and found an asylum in Christ Our Lord. Her world-wearied soul had trodden the winepress of suffering; so in Him and in His Passion her life took on new meaning.

Another rewarding essay is that on Marc Chagall. The illustrations occur between pages 104 and 105, and ought on no account to be missed. These paintings of the Crucified are full of a meaning pathos, and open up new vistas to Jew and Christian alike.

Peter Orr, S.J.